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The Promise of Profit Sharing
Martin L. Weitzman 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
I want to talk about the nature and significance of some recent trends 
toward making part of the pay of a firm's workers more automatically 
responsive to the economic well-being of the firm. These trends have 
received some attention for a variety of reasons, not least because they 
may perhaps help to reduce unemployment or improve productivity.
Lately there has been a significant interest throughout many coun 
tries of the world in gain sharing labor payment arrangements, which 
tie some part of a worker's pay to a measure of how well his or her 
company is doing. Profit sharing is perhaps the most familiar form. 
Profit sharing itself is an old idea with, I think, a venerable history. 
There are surely a number of reasons for the rekindled interest of late 
in profit sharing. A major direct spur is undoubtedly coming from the 
fierce pressure for containing costs, or at least making them somewhat 
more responsive to performance, that many industries, which were 
previously quasi protected, are now subjected to in a deregulated, in 
ternationally competitive environment. Another rationale stems from the 
more general idea that a properly instituted gain sharing plan can motivate 
workers to cooperate more fully with management in raising produc 
tivity and increasing profitability by giving them a direct stake in the 
outcome. And there is the idea that if society as a whole were to move 
toward profit sharing, it would help to soften the wicked unemployment- 
inflation tradeoff, which, especially in some European countries, bedevils 
current attempts of traditional macroeconomic policy to reconcile 
reasonably low unemployment with reasonably low inflation. It is this 
macroeconomic promise of profit sharing on which I will concentrate 
here by attempting to set forth the general case briefly and informally. 
I will present the case for profit sharing as an open advocate, not as 
a dispassionate observer. In that sense, this is an "essay in persuasion.''
I want to begin by emphasizing one centrally important fact. Even 
leaving aside the important moral and social consequences, unemploy-
91
92 The Promise of Profit Sharing
ment is extraordinarily expensive. Every percentage point of extra 
employment translates into about a 2 percent increase in national in 
come. Any scheme that would result in a meaningful reduction of 
unemployment would translate into very large increases in the value 
of goods and services being produced.
Let me digress for a few moments to talk about the Japanese ex 
perience. By any reckoning, Japan possesses a singularly outstanding 
employment record. Even after correcting for the inevitable interna 
tional differences in official reporting methods, Japanese unemployment 
rates are regularly the lowest among the major capitalist economies. 
This achievement is all the more remarkable considering that the Japanese 
have suffered as much as any other nation, and probably more so, from 
the effects of economic shocks beyond their control, including the two 
oil crises of the 1970s and the current depressed demand for exports 
caused by the rapid appreciation of the yen. While the debilitated Euro 
pean economies allowed serious long-term unemployment to develop 
and have remained mired in rates that would have been considered 
astronomical by standards of little more than a decade ago, Japan's 
unemployment rate has never exceeded 3 percent.
How do the Japanese keep unemployment so low? Are there lessons 
here for other countries?
To find answers, it is instructive to examine how Japan is now cop 
ing with its latest economic crisis. During the past couple of years, the 
yen has soared 50 percent above the trade-weighted value of the cur 
rencies of Japan's major partners. That represents a catastrophe for 
Japan's vaunted export industries, including such mighty pillars of na 
tional pride as steel, electronics, and automobiles. For these manufac 
turing industries, it is as if their products were subjected to a 50 per 
cent export tariff. In any other country that would be a sure recipe for 
mass layoffs and the beginning of a wicked snowball effect on the rest 
of the economy as the loss of purchasing power from unemployed 
workers feeds back into further layoffs. A key ingredient in the Japanese 
success story is that they seem able to contain the unemployment damage 
initially, when it first threatens, before it explodes and then becomes 
entrenched. The European experience teaches a clear alternative lesson 
about how much more difficult it is to eradicate unemployment after
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it settles in. Japan has the will, backed by an appropriate microeconomic 
structure, to deal vigorously, pragmatically, and automatically with the 
unemployment problems on the level of the firm, right from the begin 
ning. An ounce of microeconomic prevention is worth a pound of 
macroeconomic cure.
Japan's first line of defense against layoffs is the world's most flexi 
ble labor payment system. Fully one-fourth of an average Japanese 
worker's total pay comes in the form of a semiannual bonus with strong 
profit-sharing overtones. Studies show that bonus payments are 
significantly correlated with profits. The bonus represents an automatic 
shock absorbing cushion that helps save jobs during times of severe 
economic stress. Last year's reaction has been especially notable. For 
the first time since the 1950s, bonuses were cut from the previous year's 
level by all major auto makers. The total of summer and winter bonuses 
at Nissan, for example, was down by 2.6 percent from the previous 
year's amount and further reductions are probably coming. Manufac 
turing as a whole endured the only absolute decline of bonus payments 
in the postwar period. The automatic ability of Japanese companies to 
cut labor costs rapidly in the face of severe economic adversity comes 
across very clearly during times of stress like now and during the oil 
crises of the 1970s. Its job-saving potential is the envy of policymakers 
throughout the rigid European economies, whose unresponsive pay 
systems have ultimately proved their undoing in the face of contrac 
tionary shocks that have left a nasty residue of enduring European 
unemployment.
If the bonus system facilitates a Japanese company's retaining workers 
when times are bad, what does the company do with the extra workers 
when there is weak demand for its products? Herein lies Japan's sec 
ond, and complementary, line of defense against layoffs: a strong ac 
ceptance of intrafirm work mobility based on the principle of flexible 
job assignments. Instead of being laid off outright, automobile produc 
tion workers have been shifted to the sales arm of their company, or 
to a dealership to help clear inventories, or to repair jobs within the 
plant such as painting and renovation.
Although about 40 percent of factories in Japan are reportedly plan 
ning "labor force adjustments," this is not merely a euphemism for
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layoffs, as it would be in most other countries. Japanese "adjustments" 
mostly take the form of a reduction in bonuses and overtime, the en 
couragement of early retirements, and the shifting of workers to alter 
native tasks. Companies feel obligated to find other jobs for their idle 
workers, if not within the firm then among subsidiaries and affiliated 
companies. Although workers sometimes have to accept a different job, 
and only after considerable retraining, this is viewed as a welcome 
tradeoff during a time of economy wide contraction. Indeed, the famed 
Japanese "lifetime employment system" is contingent upon a high degree 
of pay flexibility and a discretionary right by the firm to alter job 
assignments. Some outright layoffs do occur, but only as a last resort, 
and principally among "temporary" workers not covered by the lifetime 
employment commitment. Even during very hard economic times, the 
total number of layoffs is sufficiently limited to keep the national 
unemployment rate from rising above 3 percent.
Are there lessons here for the rest of the world? I think so. The bat 
tle for full employment can be won. But success will likely require a 
more flexible labor payment system and a less rigid attitude toward work 
rules than are present in most Western countries today. I do not think 
it is just a coincidence that Japan, Korea, and Taiwan all have signifi 
cant bonus systems with strong profit-sharing overtones.
Let me restate that last comment about lack of coincidence somewhat 
more carefully. As was noted, Japan has an unusual labor payment 
system, where about one-fourth of an average worker's total compen 
sation comes in the form of a twice-yearly bonus supplement added onto 
base wages. It has by now been pretty firmly established that the Japanese 
bonus system can be viewed as a form of profit sharing, even though 
only about 15 percent of Japanese firms explicitly link the bonus to pro 
fitability via a prescribed formula. What I mean by saying that Japanese 
bonuses can be viewed as a form of profit sharing is simply the statistical 
statement that the ratio of bonus payments to base wages varies positively 
with business condition indicators, including profitability per employee.
Japan has enjoyed the lowest average unemployment rate among the 
major industrialized capitalist economies over the last quarter century 
or so. This comparatively outstanding employment record survives cor 
rections for discouraged workers, relatively flexible hours, definitional
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differences, and so forth. Does the existence of a profit-sharing com 
ponent of pay help in any way to account for the comparatively low, 
stable unemployment rate in Japan?
This is an easy question to ask but a very hard one to answer. The 
whole Japanese system seems to be employment promoting, so it is not 
possible to isolate cleanly the pure role of the bonus system. I think 
it is a fair statement to say that it would be more difficult for Japanese 
firms to maintain the full employment commitment without the automatic 
cushion that the bonus system provides. The Japanese experience is 
definitely suggestive or supportive of the proposition that a profit-sharing 
system can be used to help promote full employment, although it would 
be naive to try to go far beyond such a statement at this stage.
Turning now to other countries, I want to inquire briefly why 
unemployment has moved up so persistently to such stubbornly high 
levels, especially in Europe. This is a subject of dispute. Some say real 
wages are too high, others that there is insufficient aggregate demand. 
Some blame what they see as an overly generous welfare and unemploy 
ment system. And some focus on European wage rigidities and malfunc 
tioning labor markets, especially the high costs of hiring and firing 
workers. Perhaps there is some truth in all of these views.
Let me start my own analysis by asking a general question. General 
ly speaking, what causes unemployment or slack labor markets? There 
is really only one basic answer, but, like a coin, the answer has two 
sides. Side one is that unemployment is caused when firms face insuf 
ficient demand for their products relative to their marginal costs of pro 
duction. Side two is that unemployment is caused when firms have too- 
high marginal costs of production relative to the demand for their prod 
ucts. Sometimes it is useful to stress one side of the coin; sometimes 
the other. But it is always the same coin.
In either case, the key to noninflationary full employment is an 
economic expansion that holds down the marginal cost to the firm of 
acquiring more labor. Macroeconomic policy alone, the purposeful 
manipulation of financial aggregates, can be very powerful in achiev 
ing full employment or price stability, but cannot be depended upon 
to reconcile both simultaneously. Why? Because of the two-headed 
monster stagflation. Illusions of being able to fine tune aside, we know
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how to get unemployment down and output up by the usual expansionary 
monetary and fiscal measures. We also know how to break inflation 
by policy-induced recessions. What we do not know and this is the 
central economic dilemma of our time is how simultaneously to recon 
cile reasonably full employment with reasonable price stability. Expan 
sionary policies dissipate themselves, to an excessive degree, in too- 
large wage and price increases rather than expanded employment and 
output.
I think it is important to realize the following point. There is a sense 
in which the major macroeconomic problems of our day trace back, 
ultimately, to the wage system of paying labor. We try to award every 
employed worker a predetermined piece of the income pie before it is 
out of the oven, before the size of the pie is even known. Our "social 
contract" promises workers a fixed wage independent of the health of 
their company, while the company chooses the employment level. This 
stabilizes the money income of whomever is hired, but only at the con 
siderable cost of loading unemployment on low-seniority workers and 
inflation on everybody, a socially inferior risk-sharing arrangement that 
both diminishes and makes more variable the real income of workers 
as a whole. An inflexible money wage system throws the entire burden 
of economic adjustment on employment and the price level. Then 
macroeconomic policy is called upon to do the impossible reconcile 
full employment with low inflation.
A profit-sharing system, where some part of a worker's pay is tied 
to the firm's profitability per employee, puts in place exactly the right 
incentives to resist unemployment and inflation. If workers were to allow 
some part of their pay to be more flexible by sharing profits with their 
company, that would improve macroeconomic performance by direct 
ly attacking the economy's central structural rigidity. The superiority 
of a profit-sharing system is that it has enough built-in flexibility to main 
tain full employment even when the economy is out of balance from 
some shock to the system. When part of a worker's pay is a share of 
profits, the company has an automatic inducement to take on more 
employees in good times and, what is probably more significant, to lay 
off fewer workers during bad times. A profit-sharing system is not an- 
tilabor and does not rely for its beneficial effects on lowering workers'
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pay. The key thing is not to get total worker pay down it could even 
go up within reason but to lower the base wage component relative 
to the profit-sharing component. The marginal cost of labor is approx 
imately the base wage, more or less independent of the profit-sharing 
component.
Here is how the British Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson 
stated the case for profit sharing in his 1986 annual budget speech before 
the House of Commons:
The problem we face in this country is not just the level of 
pay in relation to productivity, but also the rigidity of the 
pay system. . . . This constitutes the Achilles heel of the 
British economy. . . . If the only element of flexibility is in 
the numbers of people employed, then redundancies are in 
evitably more likely to occur. One way out of this might be 
to move to a system in which a significant proportion of an 
employee's remuneration depends directly on the company's 
profitability per person employed. This would not only give 
the workforce a more direct personal interest in their com 
pany's success, as existing employee share schemes do. It 
would also mean that, when business is slack, companies 
would be under less pressure to lay men off; and by the same 
token they would in general be keener to take them on. 
Chancellor Lawson in his 1987 budget speech proposed granting fairly 
substantial tax concessions to profit-related pay, and challenged British 
business to take up the offer in the hopes that this might help to im 
prove national economic performance on the employment and output 
side. These proposals were enacted into law in August of 1987. Fully 
one-half of a British worker's profit-related pay is now tax exempt up 
to three thousand pounds or 20 percent of total pay, whichever is smaller. 
It will be interesting to follow the British experience for the empirical 
insights it should give us.
The case for widespread profit sharing is like the case for widespread 
free trade. It is not true that free trade benefits every individual. It is 
not even true, in a realistic world of increasing returns to scale and im 
perfect competition, that free trade must benefit the community as a 
whole. Yet, when all is said and done, when the possible costs and
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benefits of alternative trade policies have been calculated, weighted by 
the relevant probabilities, and added up, most economists agree that 
free trade is the best policy. The argument for profit sharing is of this 
same form. It is possible to dream up unlikely counterexamples and 
to interpret the existing evidence perversely. But the bulk of economic 
theory, empirical evidence, and common sense argue that widespread 
profit sharing will help to improve macroeconomic performance. The 
bottom line is that it is easy to envision situations where profit sharing 
helps economic performance while it is difficult to imgine scenarios 
where profit sharing damages an economy, which is as much as can 
be claimed for any economic idea.
It is no mystery why profit sharing makes the employer view things 
fundamentally differently. In a profit-sharing system, the young school 
graduate looking for work comes with an implicit message to the 
employer saying: "Hire me. I am reasonable. Your only absolute com 
mitment is to pay me the base wage. That is my marginal cost to you. 
The profit-sharing bonus is like a variable cost, depending to some ex 
tent on how well the company is doing. So you have a built-in cushion 
or shock absorber if something should go wrong. You won't be under 
such pressure to lay off me or other workers during downswings." By 
contrast, the young British or French school-leaver looking for work 
hi a wage system now comes to a potential employer with the implicit 
message: "Think very carefully before you hire me. I am expensive 
and inflexible. You will have to pay me a fixed wage independent of 
whether your company is doing well or poorly." Is it difficult to deduce 
in which situation companies might be expected to more eagerly recruit 
new hires and to retain them, and in which situation new hiring com 
mitments are likely to be avoided when possible? What is killing Euro 
pean employment is the extreme wage rigidity compared with the U.S. 
or Japan, the extreme independence of workers' pay from how well 
or poorly their company is doing.
The essence of the case for profit sharing is the basic idea that on 
the margin the profit-sharing firm is more willing than the wage firm 
to hire new workers during good times and, more importantly, to lay 
off fewer workers during bad times. From a social point of view, a 
wage system is poorly designed because it is inherently so rigid. There
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has to be a precise relation between the wage level and the level of ag 
gregate demand to just exactly hit the full employment target without 
causing inflation. By contrast, a profit-sharing system is inherently much 
more forgiving. Full employment will be maintained even if base wages 
and profit-sharing parameters are somewhat "too high" relative to ag 
gregate demand or, equivalently, aggregate demand is "too low" relative 
to pay parameters.
Let me state the basic idea why a profit-sharing economy is likely 
to have a better employment record than a wage economy as a kind 
of parable. Suppose there are two kingdoms, Old Lakeland and New 
Lakeland, which are physically identical in every way. The economies 
of both identical twin kingdoms consist exclusively of fishing from the 
numerous privately-owned lakes and exporting all of the fish at given 
world prices.
In Old Lakeland, the monarch has decreed that the money wages to 
be paid throughout the year at each lake are to be posted on January 
1 of that year and cannot be altered until January 1 of the next year. 
In New Lakeland, the monarch has decreed that payment at each lake 
shall consist of a share of the value of the fish caught per worker; the 
share fraction applying throughout the year is to be posted on January 
1 of that year and cannot be altered until January 1 of the next year. 
In both economies, once the pay parameters (wages or share fractions) 
are posted, workers are free to migrate to that highest-paying lake which 
will employ them.
Suppose that the world price of fish has been steady for as long as 
anyone cares to remember. Then Old Lakeland and New Lakeland will 
settle into a (long-run) competitive equilibrium that is exactly identical 
in every respect except that pay is called "wages" in Old Lakeland 
and "shares" in New Lakeland.
Suppose next that, suddenly and without warning, in the middle of 
one year the world price offish drops. By royal decree, pay parameters 
cannot be changed to reflect the new situation until January 1. What 
happens in this (short-run) disequilibrium? Lake owners in Old Lakeland 
will choose to lay off workers, but New Lakeland will remain at full 
employment. Lake owners in New Lakeland will have no desire to lay
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off workers because it would diminish the total size of their fixed share 
of the fish catch.
This basic parable can be amended in various ways, including alter 
native labor supply assumptions, without destroying its essential message. 
A share economy will have a tendency to remain at full employment 
after contractionary shocks, because employers want to retain workers, 
while a wage economy will likely exhibit unemployment, because firms 
wish to shed labor.
Let me turn to the issue of how a share economy might affect the 
so-called "nonmflationary rate of unemployment," or NAIRU. In a 
highly idealized frictionless world of perfect information, long-run 
equilibrium is the same under wage and share systems. In an idealized 
long run, Old Lakeland and New Lakeland are isomorphic and both 
have zero rates of unemployment. But what about somewhat more 
realistic situations. Is the "share natural rate" of unemployment lower 
than the "wage natural rate?" The formal analysis of unemployment 
comparisons between Old Lakeland and New Lakeland in my story was 
based on short-run disequilibrium considerations, when pay parameters 
are quasi-fixed. But might widespread sharing also lower the natural 
rate under a more realistic concept of long-run equilibrium than was 
treated in the Lakeland example?
The answer is: yes, it presumably would. Furthermore, the short- 
run and long-run unemployment problems are probably related.
In order to talk meaningfully about the effects of profit sharing on 
the natural rate of unemployment, one has first to have some idea about 
what is causing a positive natural rate in the first place. There are several 
theories. Some are more persuasive than others, and they are not mutual 
ly exclusive.
A leading theory contends that long-term unemployment is largely 
inertial or hysteresis-like. Whatever initial disequilibrium caused the 
increased unemployment in the first place, once unemployment con 
tinues long enough it almost gets built into the system perhaps because 
the long-term unemployed outsiders cannot or do not act effectively as a 
disciplining force in wage setting, perhaps because working skills atrophy 
without work, perhaps because the plight of the long-term unemployed 
gets forgotten by the electorate, perhaps for other reasons. In this view
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the rate of change of unemployment typically has a more powerful ef 
fect on wage settlements than the absolute level of unemployment.
If this kind of inertial effect lies behind the too-high natural rate, then 
presumably widespread profit sharing would lower or eliminate it. The 
long-term unemployment would have difficulty developing in the first 
place out of an initial contractionary shock because profit-sharing firms 
are reluctant to let go of workers. Taking as given this kind of natural 
rate unemployment, leaving aside how it got started in the past, the in 
grained expansionary bias of a profit-sharing system should act as a 
built-in counterforce to help absorb the unemployed. The absorption 
process could of course be speeded by traditional expansionary 
macroeconomic policies which, under profit sharing, presumably pose 
less danger of causing prices to accelerate because the employment- 
inflation tradeoff has been improved. So any way you look at it, profit 
sharing looks as if it ought to help diminish long-term inertial 
unemployment.
Another theory of why the natural rate is so high is that labor has 
too much bargaining power. Whether a switch from a wage system to 
profit sharing would lower this kind of NAIRU depends on what it is 
that labor and management bargain over. If they bargain over pay 
parameters, but management contrails the employment decision, a switch 
to profit sharing would lower the NAIRU. If labor and management 
bargain over both pay parameters and employment levels, the NAIRU 
would be the same under either system. In-between bargaining would 
yield in-between results, with the NAIRU then being somewhat lower 
under profit sharing than under a wage system.
A third class of theories, based on the so-called "efficiency wage 
hypothesis," holds that long-term unemployment is caused by companies 
themselves choosing to pay above market-clearing wages because other 
wise workers would shirk too much on the job. Within this kind of model 
the natural rate would be the same under a wage or profit-sharing system.
To the extent that too-high unemployment in some economies is aid 
ed by "overly generous" unemployment and welfare benefits, which 
creates some voluntary unemployment, presumably the labor payment 
mechanism per se makes little or no difference. So "the revenge of 
the welfare state" kind of unemployment should not be affected by a 
switch to profit sharing.
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Finally, there is the longstanding identification of the "natural rate" 
with semipermanent frictional or structural unemployment, due to con 
tinuously occurring microeconomic changes. This kind of unemploy 
ment, it is usually said, cannot be reduced by pure macroeconomic 
policies except temporarily and at the cost of increasing inflation. As 
with inertial unemployment, however, the wage system is heavily im 
plicated in frictional or structural concepts of the NAIRU. After all, 
both wage and profit-sharing systems respond to shifts in relative 
demands by sending a signal that eventually transfers workers out of 
a losing firm or sector and over to a winner. With a wage system, the 
signal to workers that their firm is a loser in the game of capitalist roulette 
and that it is time to look for a new job with a winning firm is the boot  
the worker is laid off and must suffer through an unemployment spell 
of some duration while searching for the new job. Under a profit-sharing 
system, the firm does not voluntarily let go of a worker because of weak 
demand. Instead it is the worker who chooses to leave because pay is 
too low relative to what is available elsewhere at relatively more suc 
cessful firms.
Summing up, in none of the standard scenarios does a profit-sharing 
system cause a higher NAIRU than a wage system, and in most of the 
more reasonable descriptions a profit-sharing system generates a lower 
NAIRU than a wage system. In addition, of course, the profit-sharing 
system has better disequilibrium properties when pay parameters are 
sticky in the neighborhood of the NAIRU unemployment rate.
It should be noted that not all forms of share systems bring about 
equally desirable macroeconomic benefits. For example, such widely 
disparate systems as employee ownership, or piece-rate formulas, or 
Swedish style economy wide workers' fund schemes, unlike profit sharing 
do not necessarily alter the employer's attitude about hiring or laying 
off workers.
I do not have nearly enough time here to deal fully with objections 
that are traditionally raised against profit sharing. Some of these ob 
jections raise legitimate issues. But some seem to me a bit wide of the 
mark. Many of them involve a fallacy of composition a fallacious 
generalization from what is ostensibly good for the tenured high-seniority 
insider worker, who already has job security, to the level of what is good
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for the community of all would-be workers, which is quite a different 
matter. Perhaps the most egregious example of this kind of fallacious 
compositional reasoning is the argument that profit sharing allegedly 
exposes workers to unnecessary risk.
This risk argument, so widely parroted and seemingly so plausible, 
embodies, at least in its crude form, a classical fallacy of composition. 
What is a correct statement for the individual high-seniority worker who 
already has job tenure is patently false for the aggregate of all would- 
be workers. The problem of unemployment is in fact the largest in 
come risk that labor as a whole, as opposed to the median tenured 
worker, faces, and it is concentrated entirely on the marginal or out 
sider worker. If more variable pay for the individual helps to preserve 
full employment for the group, while fixed pay for the individual tends 
to contribute to unemployment, it is not the least bit clear why overall 
welfare is improved by having the median worker paid a fixed wage. 
Actually, the correct presumption runs the other way around.
What is true for the individual tenured worker is not true for labor 
as a whole. When a more complete analysis is performed, which con 
siders the situation not as seen by a tenured, high-seniority worker who 
already has job security, but by a neutral observer representing the en 
tire population, it becomes abundantly clear that the welfare advantages 
of a profit-sharing system (which tends to deliver full employment) are 
enormously greater than a wage system (which permits unemployment). 
The basic reason is not difficult to understand. A wage system allows 
huge first-order losses of output and welfare to open up when a signifi 
cant slice of the national income pie evaporates with unemployment. 
A profit-sharing system helps to stabilize aggregate output at the full 
employment level, creating the biggest possible national income pie, 
while permitting only small second-order losses to arise because of 
relatively limited random redistributions from a worker in one firm to 
a worker in another. It is extremely difficult to cook up an empirical 
real-world scenario, with reasonable numbers and specifications, where 
a profit-sharing system with a moderate amount of profit sharing (say 
20 percent of a worker's total pay) does not deliver significantly greater 
social welfare than a wage system.
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Any economy is full of uncertainty. There are no absolute guarantees, 
and if the uncertainty does not come out in one place, it will show up 
in another. I am saying that it is much better, much healthier, if everyone 
shares just a little bit of that uncertainty right at the beginning rather 
than letting it all fall on an unfortunate minority of unemployed workers 
who are drafted to serve as unpaid soldiers in the war against inflation. 
It is much fairer if people will agree that only 80 percent of their pay 
is going to be tied directly to the funny looking green pieces of paper 
(which are themselves an illusion, although a very useful illusion) and 
20 percent will be tied to company profits per employee. Then the 
economy can be much more easily controlled to have full employment 
and stable prices. Society will be producing, and hence consuming, at 
its full potential. If people will face up to the uncertainty, and if everyone 
accepts some small part of it, then society as a whole will end up with 
higher income and less uncertainty overall.
Another fallacy of composition is often involved when opponents of 
profit sharing argue that additional hired workers dilute the profits per 
worker which the previously hired workers receive, thereby possibly 
causing resentment by the already existing labor force against newly 
hired workers which, in extreme cases, might lead to restrictions against 
new hires. The fallacy of composition here lies in failing to account 
for the fact that under widespread profit sharing and relatively free hir 
ing there would also be a tight labor market, and hence an employer 
cannot so easily pick up jobless people off the streets, because they are 
just not there.
Incidentally, this kind of profit-dilution argument may be a bit of a 
red herring on other grounds as well. Even a one-sided, worst-case 
scenario where profit sharing "merely" dampens economic downturns 
by encouraging employers to lay off fewer workers during recessions 
still represents an economic benefit to the community of potentially enor 
mous magnitude. In periods of recession and other kinds of squeeze, 
the "insiders" risk becoming "outsiders" and they may well be glad 
of a system which, without painful renegotiations, will enable an 
automatic adjustment hi pay to be made to preserve jobs, which would 
be self-reversing in recovery. Remember, also, that even in periods 
of normal growth there will always be firms under pressure to reduce
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employment and anything which lessens that pressure will help overall 
employment. To ratchet an economy toward a tight labor market and 
improve the employment-inflation tradeoff so that macroeconomic 
policies can be used more effectively requires only that, on the margin, 
during downswings a few less old workers are laid off and during up 
swings no fewer new workers are hired.
So far as internal labor relations are concerned, in comparing alter 
native payment mechanisms let us not forget that the-wage system is 
hardly a bed of roses. Younger, untenured workers are pitted against 
older high-seniority workers in the jobs vs. wages decision. Featherbed- 
ding is widespread. Workers resist the introduction of new labor-saving 
technology, resist job reassignments, and, more generally, take relatively 
little interest in the fortunes of the company because they do not have 
any direct stake in its profitability. Worker alienation is widespread in 
an environment where the employer is essentially indifferent on the 
margin to whether the worker stays or goes.
Arguments about profit sharing causing underinvestment strike me 
as basically wrong, in theory and in practice. The critics have in mind 
a situation where pay parameters are more or less permanently frozen. 
In that case, profit sharing would, indeed, cause underinvestment for 
the well-publicized reason that any incremental profits would have to 
be shared with labor. (Incidentally, this should make workers proinvest- 
ment, so the critics cannot have it both ways in any case.) But over 
the longer time horizon relevant to decisions about durable capital in 
vestments, where either base wages or profit-sharing coefficients (or 
both) respond to the invisible hand of the market and the visible hand 
of collective bargaining, both wage and profit-sharing systems stimulate 
equal efforts toward output-increasing improvements to the point where 
the marginal value of capital equals the interest rate. Even if this 
theoretical isomorphism between investment in wage and share systems, 
which is well understood in modern economic theory, did not exist, 
the cost of capital is only one side of the picture, and probably the less 
important side. The more dominant consideration is the demand side. 
If profit sharing results in a macroeconomic environment where output 
is being stabilized at or near the full-employment, full-capacity level, 
while a wage economy results in erratic, fluctuation-prone output and
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capacity utilization levels, there is bound to be more investment in a 
profit-sharing economy. And, as if these two arguments were not enough, 
interest rates, investment tax credits, and the like could be used to in 
fluence investment decisions in any system. The really important distinc 
tion concerns the average level of unemployed resources.
I have concentrated mostly on the favorable macroeconomic effects 
of profit sharing. But the microeconomic properties, the effects on 
motivation and productivity, may also be significant. This is of special 
interest in a world where international competitiveness is so crucially 
important. The two biggest economic tasks of our time are to resolve 
the unemployment-inflation dilemma and to increase productivity 
growth. It is just possible that a well-designed profit-sharing economy 
has a big advantage in both of these important areas.
The few formal studies that have been done tend to show that greater 
profit sharing in firms is positively related to increased productivity. 
One of the problems in interpreting this result is that it is not clear 
whether the profit sharing is causing the higher productivity or whether 
some hidden third factor, call it superior management, tends to cause 
the more progressive firms to have both profit sharing and high 
productivity.
Most economists would say that there are no grounds for subsidizing 
profit sharing on its possible productivity-enhancing merits because these 
are strictly internal to the firm. Firms do not need to be subsidized to 
take other productivity-enhancing measures, so why should they be 
especially subsidized for profit sharing? I mostly agree with this inter 
pretation, but I am not entirely sure because in practice a labor pay 
ment mechanism may have large demonstration effects.
As for the employment stabilizing effects of profit sharing on the level 
of the individual firm, these have only just begun to be studied in a 
formal way. There are some preliminary indications that profit-sharing 
firms are more resistant to layoffs during downswings. My distinct im 
pression from talking with representatives from a fair number of profit- 
sharing firms is that the built-in profit-sharing shock absorber protects 
jobs during bad times and that both labor and management understand 
this feature quite well, to the point of regarding it as self-evident.
Let me address the following question, which economists are naturally 
fond of asking. If profit sharing represents such a good idea for operating
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a market economy, why don't we see more examples of it arising 
spontaneously?
First of all, as was previously indicated, there are some significant 
examples of profit sharing. In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, it can be 
argued, steps have been taken in this direction. The performance of 
these economies hardly supports the view that widespread profit shar 
ing is likely to prove harmful to economic health. In the U.S. economy, 
about 15 percent to 20 percent of firms have what they call profit-sharing 
plans. Although the issue has not been carefully studied in a rigorous 
way, it is clear that many of these profit-sharing firms are among the 
most progressive, advanced companies in the economy. As just one in 
formal indication, in a well-known book called The 100 Best Companies 
to Work for in America, over half of the cited companies have profit- 
sharing plans of some kind.
The reason profit sharing is not more widespread despite its benefits 
involves an externality or market failure of possibly enormous 
magnitude. In choosing a particular contract form, the firm and its 
workers only calculate the effects on themselves. They take no account 
whatsoever of the possible effects on the rest of the economy. When 
a firm and its workers select a labor contract with a strong profit-sharing 
component, they are contributing to an atmosphere of full employment 
and brisk aggregate demand without inflation because the firm is then 
more willing to hire new "outsider" workers and to expand output by 
riding down its demand curve, lowering its price. But these 
macroeconomic advantages to the outsiders do not properly accrue to 
those insiders who make the decision. Like clean air, the benefits are 
spread throughout the community. The wage firm and its workers do 
not have the proper incentives to cease polluting the macroeconomic 
environment by converting to a share contract. The essence of the public 
good aspect of the problem is that, in choosing between contract forms, 
the firm and its workers do not take into account the employment ef 
fects on the labor market as a whole and the consequent spending im 
plications for aggregate demand. The macroeconomic externality of a 
tight labor market is helped by a share contract and hurt by a wage con 
tract, but the difference is uncompensated. In such situations there can 
be no presumption that the economy is optimally organized and society-
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wide reform may be needed to nudge firms and workers towards in 
creased profit sharing.
Perhaps it is appropriate to end by commenting on one important dif 
ference between how someone with an economist's perspective is like 
ly to view labor payment systems and how someone coming from a 
pure industrial relations background is likely to see things. The economist 
tends to regard narrowly defined industrial relations as essentially con 
cerned with the interests of two parties at the workplace: management, 
and the already employed, in-place, existing core labor force, or "in 
sider" workers in the economist's jargon. Relatively little attention is 
paid to third party "outsiders," the unemployed and those who, when 
they have jobs, constitute the low-seniority, untenured, last-hired and 
first-fired. Yet industrial relations generally, and pay policies in par 
ticular, have profound effects on unemployment and inflation. And 
unemployment is extraordinarily expensive, not to mention immoral. 
Surely it is possible to craft an industrial relations system that preserves 
most of the traditional desiderata which insiders value but builds in 
stronger incentives to employ more outsiders and to keep them employed 
through thick and thin.
The industrial relations side of what I am proposing is far from trivial. 
There are genuine, legitimate, tough issues involved in reconciling the 
many, already inherently conflictual, goals of traditional industrial rela 
tions with the additional burden of creating incentives to retain more 
workers during bad times and to take on more of them during good 
times. Any industrial relations system is a complicated package, of which 
pay is only one element. Trust between management and labor is an 
important part of most successful profit-sharing schemes. I do not pre 
tend to know exactly how to design a socially optimal industrial rela 
tions pay system under the real world constraints that are out there. 
What I am saying is that we should be placing much more emphasis 
on the employment consequences of industrial relations than we are now 
doing, and that it seems to me that anything resembling a socially op 
timal solution is very likely to involve some form of profit related pay 
to help stabilize employment at higher levels.
Let me conclude with a final message in this attempted persuasion. 
Government encouragement of widespread profit sharing, through moral
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suasion and tax incentives for profit-sharing income, represents a decen 
tralized, market-oriented way of improving national economic perfor 
mance which is well worth pursuing.
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